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Productivity Growth, Wage Growth and 
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By Alice Kügler2, Uta Schönberg3 and Ragnhild Schreiner4 
Abstract 
This paper reviews trends in labor productivity, wage growth, unemployment and 
inequality over the past two decades in nine advanced countries. We focus on the two 
largest countries in the eurozone, Germany and France, which experienced similar 
increases in productivity over the past 20 years. In France wages grew in tandem with 
productivity, inequality declined and unemployment remains stubbornly high. In 
Germany, in contrast, wages largely stagnated (until 2008), inequality increased (until 
2010), but unemployment is now at a record low. This paper argues that the divergent 
development of Germany and France is in part a consequence of an unprecedented 
decentralization of the wage-setting process in Germany, from the sectoral level down 
to the level of the firm or the individual. In contrast, the distinctive characteristics of 
France’s system of industrial relations prevented France from a similar downward 
adjustment of wages. 
1 Introduction 
Nearly ten years after the Great Recession, unemployment rates vastly differ across 
advanced countries. In Germany, unemployment is now at a record low of 4%. In the 
United Kingdom and the United States, unemployment rates have returned to their 
low pre-crisis levels, but wage growth has been sluggish. In France, by contrast, 
unemployment remains stubbornly high at above 9%. The situation looks even more 
bleak in Italy and Spain where unemployment rates today are 5 and 9 percentage 
points higher than prior to the Great Recession (OECD, 2018). 
In the first part of this paper, we review trends in labor productivity, aggregate wage 
growth, unemployment and inequality over the past two decades across nine 
advanced countries. We look at the four largest countries of the eurozone: Germany, 
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France, Italy, and Spain; two countries that are generally believed to have very 
flexible labor markets: the United Kingdom and the United States; and the 
Scandinavian countries: Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
A comparison between the two largest economies of the eurozone, France and 
Germany, reveals some striking differences in recent developments. Labor 
productivity has evolved at a similar pace in the two countries, averaging about 1.5% 
of growth per year over the last 20 years. However, while mean wages have moved in 
tandem with productivity in France, mean wages in Germany were barely higher in 
2008 than they were in 1995. The differences in wage growth are particularly striking 
at the bottom of the wage distribution. Whereas wages at the 10th percentile of the 
wage distribution declined by over 10% between 1995 and 2008 in Germany, they 
increased by nearly 20% in France. Wages at the 90th percentile, in contrast, rose 
faster in Germany than in France. Since mean wages grew much faster in France than 
in Germany despite similar productivity growth in the two countries, unit labor costs 
(i.e. total wage costs divided by labor productivity, a commonly used measure of 
competitiveness) improved in Germany relative to France and other countries over the 
same period. Wage growth has picked up in Germany in the post-recession years, and 
now closely follows that in France. At the same time, the two countries vastly differ with 
respect to unemployment: whereas the unemployment rate is at a record low below 
4% in Germany, it remains stubbornly high at about 10% in France. 
The United States and the United Kingdom experienced healthy productivity growth 
prior to the Great Recession, averaging about 2% per year between 1995 and 2008. In 
the post-recession years, however, productivity has largely stagnated in both 
countries. Whereas wages have decoupled from productivity in the United States and 
the labor share in GDP declined accordingly, wage growth outpaced productivity 
growth in the United Kingdom until the Great Recession. The two countries further 
differ with respect to trends in inequality: whereas in the United States wages grew at 
the top of the wage distribution (but not at the bottom), inequality remained roughly 
constant in the United Kingdom. 
Spain and Italy have experienced virtually no improvements in living standards 
(measured as CPI-deflated average total labor compensation per hour worked) 
neither before nor after the crisis, in large part because of stagnating labor productivity 
(measured as GDP at fixed prices per hour worked). These two countries are further 
crippled by exceptionally high unemployment rates. 
The three Scandinavian countries are generally characterized by robust productivity 
growth and relatively low unemployment over the past 20 years, both before and after 
the Great Recession, and (GDP-deflated) wages have grown at a similar rate as 
productivity. 
Based on these country examinations, it is worth noting that the developments in the 
nine countries do not all confirm common conceptions that labor markets across the 
globe are experiencing rising wage inequality (e.g. International Monetary Fund, 
2015), and a decoupling of wages from productivity, leading to a decline in the labor 
share in GDP (Schwellnus et al., 2017). Among the nine countries examined, the 
labor share consistently declined in only two countries over the last 20 years: 
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Germany and the United States. In these two countries, wage inequality has 
increased over the same time period. The increase in inequality was concentrated at 
the top of the wage distribution (i.e. the 90th percentile rose relative to the median) in 
the United States, whereas it occurred both at the bottom and the top in Germany 
(i.e. in addition the median rose relative to the 10th percentile). While wage inequality 
also increased in Sweden over the same period, it remained roughly constant in 
Norway and, perhaps surprisingly, the United Kingdom, and declined significantly in 
France. 
In the second part of the paper, we revisit possible explanations for the divergent 
trends in labor productivity, wage growth, unemployment and inequality observed in 
the nine countries. We focus on the four largest economies of the eurozone, 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and the role of unions in the wage-setting process. 
In all four countries, the dominant form of collective bargaining takes place at the 
sectoral level, where trade unions bargain with employer federations over pay, working 
hours and working conditions. Union wages typically act as minimum wages, and are 
often differentiated according to occupation, skill, experience or seniority. Despite 
these similarities, there are also substantial differences. Most importantly, in Germany, 
union agreements apply to only those firms that belong to an employer federation. 
Firms’ membership of an employer federation is voluntary. Firms can leave the 
employer association at their own discretion; they can also decide not to join the 
employer federation in the first place. Firms in Germany therefore are not forced to 
recognize union agreements. This is in sharp contrast to the system in France, where 
the state declares sectoral union agreements as binding for all firms in the sector. 
Similar extension mechanisms exist de facto in Spain and Italy. 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the German economy was burdened by the high costs 
of reunification, and firms had the opportunity to relocate production to Central and 
Eastern European countries where workers are highly skilled and wages are low. 
Consequently, it became increasingly costly for firms to recognize sectoral union 
agreements, and more and more firms opted out. Whereas in 1996, about 80% of 
workers were covered by union agreements (either at the sectoral or the firm level), by 
2016 union coverage rates had fallen to 53%. In firms that opt out of sectoral union 
agreements, wages are then either set collectively at the level of the firm, through 
negotiations between the firm and the work council (i.e. workers’ representatives in the 
firm), or through negotiations between the firm and the individual worker. The fall in 
union coverage rates has thus led to a decentralization of the wage-setting process, 
from the industry level to the firm or even individual level. This decline also contributed 
to the low wage growth observed in Germany between 1995 and 2008, in particular at 
the bottom of the wage distribution. 
As more and more firms left sectoral union agreements, trade unions were willing to 
make concessions unheard of in other countries, in order to prevent a further loss in 
influence. First, trade unions often agreed to so-called opening clauses that allow 
firms that are in principle bound by a sectoral union agreement nevertheless to pay 
wages below the union wage, provided that the work council in the firm agrees. 
Opening clauses lead to a further decentralization of the wage-setting process, by 
shifting collective bargaining from the sectoral to the firm level and strengthening the 
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work council’s role in the wage-setting process. Second, trade unions in Germany 
showed extraordinary wage restraint throughout prolonged periods of time over the 
past two decades, even in periods of increasing labor productivity and declining 
unemployment. Opening clauses and the wage restraint shown by unions further 
contributed to the low wage growth observed in Germany between 1995 and 2008. It 
is important to emphasize that this process of increased wage decentralization 
occurred outside the political process, without the intervention of the German 
government, and has not been met with substantial resistance by trade unions or 
workers. 
Following the Great Recession, the decline in union coverage in Germany has slowed 
down. With unemployment rates at a record low in Germany, trade unions have also 
become more aggressive in their wage demands. In consequence, wage growth has 
started to pick up, and now evolves at a similar pace as in France. At the same time, 
France and Spain have recently moved a step closer to Germany’s system of 
industrial relations, by implementing reforms aimed at shifting collective bargaining 
from the sectoral to the firm level. These reforms were controversial and have been 
met with some resistance by both trade unions and workers. Whether they will be 
successful in improving competitiveness and ultimately in bringing down 
unemployment in these countries remains to be seen. 
2 The Facts 
2.1 Trends in Labor Productivity 
The key determinant of a worker’s wage is her productivity. Economic theory 
emphasizes that firms will continue to hire workers as long as the gains from hiring an 
additional worker (i.e. the value of the marginal product of labor) exceed the cost of 
hiring that worker (i.e. her wage). In a competitive labor market, wages should thus be 
equal to the value of the marginal product of labor. Even in imperfectly competitive 
labor markets, sustained increases in real wages, and thus improvements in living 
standards, are possible only through sustained increases in labor productivity. 
Chart 1 shows trends in aggregate labor productivity (measured as real GDP per hour 
worked) and hourly compensation per worker, from 1995 to 2016 for a selected set of 
countries, and sourced from the OECD Economic Indicators. The nine countries 
include the four biggest countries of the eurozone: Germany, France, Italy and Spain; 
two countries considered to have highly flexible labor markets: the United States and 
the United Kingdom; and the Scandinavian countries: Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
Consider first the evolution of aggregate labor productivity in these countries (the solid 
black line in the chart). Most of the countries considered experienced robust growth in 
labor productivity in the first half of the period, between 1995 and 2005, averaging 
1.7% per year in Denmark; about 2% in France and Germany; about 2.3% in the 
United Kingdom and Norway; and about 3% in Sweden and the United States. The 
exceptions are Italy and Spain, which hardly experienced any increase in labor 
productivity over this period. 




Labor Productivity and Total Hourly Labor Compensation Growth, 1995-2016 
Germany United Kingdom United States 
   
France Italy Spain 
   
Sweden Norway Denmark 
   
Sources: OECD Economic Indicators. 
Notes: The graphs plot GDP per hour worked as a measure of labor productivity (black line) and labor compensation per hour worked, 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index (red line) and the GDP Price Index (blue line) from 1995 to 2016 in nine selected OECD 
countries. The GDP Price Index reflects changes in the prices of goods and services produced in the country, while the Consumer Price 
Index measures the retail prices of a fixed basket of goods and services consumed. GDP per hour worked is defined as GDP at fixed 
prices (deflated by the GDP Price Index) divided by total hours worked of all persons engaged in production. Labor compensation per 
hour worked is defined as total labor costs – employers’ social security contributions in addition to gross wages and salaries – divided by 
total hours worked by employees. 
The picture is markedly different in the second half of the period, between 2005 and 
2016. Labor productivity has nearly stagnated in the United Kingdom after the Great 
Recession. The United States and Norway likewise experienced hardly any increase 
in aggregate labor productivity in the post-recession years, and in Sweden, 
productivity growth has significantly slowed down since the Great Recession. The 
picture looks somewhat more optimistic in Germany and Denmark where labor 
productivity growth now is roughly back to its pre-recession trend. In France, labor 
productivity stagnated between 2005 and 2010 but productivity growth has since then 
picked up once more, averaging about 1.8% per year. The two Southern European 
countries, Italy and Spain, have not fared much better in the second half of the period 
compared to the first. Over the past decade, labor productivity grew by 1% in Italy. The 
only period during which Spain witnessed considerable growth in labor productivity is 
the Great Recession years when the unemployment rate shot up to 25% (see 
Chart 3). The productivity increase (measured here as output per hour worked) is 
therefore primarily a result of a sharp decline in labor input. The productivity increase 
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particularly sharp decline in employment in the construction sector over this period – a 
sector with relatively low levels of labor productivity (Bonhomme and Hospido, 2017). 
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed analysis of why labor 
productivity grew at vastly different rates across countries, and slowed down after the 
Great Recession in some countries, but not in others. The slow productivity growth in 
Italy and Spain has been extensively analyzed, and its causes are likely structural (as 
opposed to cyclical) (e.g. Mora-Saguinetti and Fuentes, 2012; Xifre, 2016; Bugamelli 
and Lotti, 2018). Possible explanations include a reliance on low-productivity sectors, 
inefficient regulation that hampers the growth of small and median-sized firms, 
inefficient public administration, a two-tier labor market in which workers on permanent 
contracts are reluctant to switch jobs even if they are not well suited for the job, and a 
rigid labor market more generally. In the United Kingdom and United States, different 
explanations have been proposed for the sluggish productivity growth following the 
Great Recession. These include reduced investments and reduced reliance on cheap 
production inputs imported from China and other emerging markets. The change in 
the composition of firms is likely to be a further factor: with record-low interest rates, 
less productive firms that would go bankrupt under higher interest rates stay in 
business (see Tenreyro, 2018, for the United Kingdom, and Manyika et al., 2017, for 
the United States). In the United States, the decline in productivity growth in the 
post-recession years has further been attributed to the slowdown in the growth of 
sectors that significantly contributed to the robust productivity growth prior to the Great 
Recession, in particular, information technology, retail and wholesale sectors. 
More generally, it is important to emphasize that the aggregate trends in labor 
productivity depicted in Chart 1 reflect, in part, changes in the industry structure. Both 
the level and the growth rate of labor productivity tend to be higher in the 
manufacturing sector than in the tradable and non-tradable service sector (e.g. Wölfl, 
2003). All else equal, we would therefore expect low growth in labor productivity in 
countries, or time periods, that are characterized by large declines in manufacturing. 
However, a differential decline of the manufacturing sector alone cannot explain why 
labor productivity growth slowed down following the Great Recession in countries 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States, but not in Germany. In the United 
States, the employment share in manufacturing decreased from 23.6% in 1995 to 
20.3% in 2008 (when labor productivity grew by nearly 3% per year), then sharply 
dropped during the Great Recession, after which it stabilized at around 19% (when 
labor productivity barely increased). A similar pattern is observed in the United 
Kingdom. In Germany – where the share of workers employed in manufacturing is 
considerably higher than in the United States (27.3% vs. about 19% in 2016) and the 
United Kingdom – the employment share in manufacturing continued to decline, in the 
post-recession years, though at a slower pace.5 Yet, unlike in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, labor productivity in Germany continued to increase. 
                                                                    
5  International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. 
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2.2 Trends in Wage Growth 
Does real wage growth track labor productivity growth? Or did wages “decouple” from 
productivity? 
Chart 1 depicts, in addition to trends in labor productivity (GDP per hour worked, in 
fixed prices), trends in total hourly labor compensation, sourced from the OECD 
Economic Indicators. The compensation measure includes non-wage components of 
compensation, such as employers’ social security contributions, to provide a 
comprehensive measure of workers’ wages and benefits and employers’ labor costs.6 
The dashed red line in Chart 1 shows labor compensation deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). The CPI is meant to capture changes in a consumer's cost of living, 
and is constructed as the level of retail prices of a fixed basket of goods and services, 
consumed by a representative consumer, at a specific point in time. The solid blue line 
depicts labor compensation deflated by the GDP deflator (the same deflator we use to 
construct the time series on real labor productivity). This index reflects changes in the 
prices of goods and services produced in the country, and unlike for the CPI, the 
“basket” for the GDP deflator is allowed to change over time with countries' production 
patterns. Differences between the two price indices are likely to mostly reflect changes 
in terms of trade, i.e. changes in a country's export prices, relative to changes in its 
import prices.7 For simplicity, we will refer to the CPI and GDP deflated total labor 
compensation as the consumer and producer wage. 
Two countries – Germany and the United States – stand out with a noticeable 
“decoupling” of wages and labor productivity. Over the past two decades, labor 
productivity rose by about 30% in Germany, whereas the consumer wage increased 
by only 18%. Over the same period, labor productivity grew by about 40% in the 
United States, while the consumer wage rose by only 25%. It is worth pointing out that 
in both countries this decoupling primarily occurred in the years prior to the Great 
Recession, between 1995 and 2008. Over this period, German workers essentially 
saw no improvements in their living standards (measured here as the consumer wage) 
although labor productivity increased by nearly 1.5% per year. Following the Great 
Recession, consumer wage growth has picked up, and now traces labor productivity 
growth closely. In the United States, productivity growth outpaced consumer wage 
growth by about one third between 1995 and 2008. Since 2010, both labor productivity 
and the consumer wage have largely stagnated. A second point worth emphasizing is 
that in both Germany and the United States, the decoupling between labor productivity 
and wage growth is less pronounced when wages are deflated using the GDP price 
index rather than the CPI. That is, these two countries were somewhat “unfortunate” 
with respect to their terms of trade in that import prices increased faster than export 
prices, limiting improvements in living standards to some extent. Yet, in both the 
                                                                    
6  In the nine countries considered, total compensation (including non-wage components) grew slightly 
more than wage compensation (excluding non-wage components) over the period considered. 
7  See e.g. Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013) for a more detailed discussion. 
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United States and Germany, the producer wage also grew at a slower rate than labor 
productivity, implying that the labor share in GDP declined in these two countries.8 
In the other countries considered in this paper, consumer wage growth either closely 
tracks productivity growth (in France, Italy, Spain and Denmark) or outpaces 
productivity growth (in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Norway) over the past two 
decades. In these countries, the labor share of GDP either remained constant or 
increased. 
In Sweden and Norway, the consumer wage growth relative to labor productivity 
growth over the past two decades is particularly striking – consumer wages rose by 
20% more than real labor productivity in Sweden, and by a whopping 40% more in 
Norway. Producer wage growth and labor productivity growth on the other hand, track 
each other much more closely. The labor share in GDP therefore remained roughly 
constant over the past two decades in these two countries. Norway, in particular, 
experienced an extraordinary improvement in its terms of trade, allowing its citizens to 
enjoy large improvements in living standards that exceed those implied by the 
increases in labor productivity. 
Turning to the United Kingdom, from 1995 up to the Great Recession, the country 
witnessed a strong productivity growth, of about 2.3% per year, and an even stronger 
wage growth (both consumer and producer wages) of about 3% per year.9 Following 
the Great Recession, between 2010 and 2016, productivity growth and producer wage 
growth largely stagnated, while consumer wage growth fell by about 4%. 
The two Southern European countries considered, Italy and Spain, experienced 
virtually no improvement in living standards over the past decades, due to nearly 
non-existent productivity growth. 
A closer comparison of France and Germany, the two largest economies in the 
eurozone, reveals a dramatic difference in the development of competitiveness over 
the past two decades. Between 1995 and 2016, average labor productivity grew at 
similar rates in the two countries (except from 2006 to 2007 when labor productivity 
rose by 3% in Germany but slightly declined in France) – compare the solid blue and 
green lines in Panel A of Chart 2. Inflation, measured as the Consumer Price Index, 
also evolved at a similar pace in the two countries (the blue and green dashed lines 
Panel B of Chart 2). The GDP Price Index (the solid blue and green lines in the chart), 
in contrast, rose faster in France than in Germany. The two countries further radically 
differ with respect to aggregate wage growth. In Germany, consumer wages were 
hardly higher in 2008 than they were in 1995 (the dashed blue line in Panel A). In 
France, in contrast, consumer wages increased by 18% over the same period (the 
dashed green line in Panel A). The vast difference in wage growth, despite similar 
growth rates in productivity, implies that from 1995 to 2008, Germany considerably 
                                                                    
8  Let X denote GDP in fixed prices, Q the GDP price index, N the number of hours worked, and W the 
nominal hourly wage. The labor share in GDP can then be defined as WN/QX. The labor share will 
decline if labor productivity X/N (the black line in Chart 1) grows faster than the producer wage W/Q (the 
blue line in Chart 1). 
9  If a somewhat longer time period starting in 1988 is considered, labor productivity growth and growth in 
total labor compensation track each other relatively closely (see for example, Pessoa and Van Reenen, 
2013, and Machin, 2016). 
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improved its competitive position relative to France (as shown in Panel C) and other 
European countries such as Italy and Spain. Whereas unit labor costs (computed as 
the nominal hourly wage divided by labor productivity), a commonly used measure for 
a country’s competitiveness, rose by 18% in France over this period, they remained 
roughly constant in Germany.10 In the post-recession years, wages, productivity and 
in consequence unit labor costs evolved at a similar pace in the two countries. 
Chart 2 
Inflation and Growth in Labor Productivity, Hourly Compensation and Unit Labor Costs in Germany and France, 
1995-2016 
Panel A: Labor Productivity and Consumer Wages Panel B: GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index 
Panel C: Unit Labor Costs 
Sources: OECD Economic Indicators. 
Notes: The graphs compare GDP per hour worked as a measure of labor productivity and CPI-deflated total labor compensation per hour worked (Panel A), the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and the GDP Price Index (Panel B), and unit labor costs (Panel C) in Germany (blue lines) and France (green lines) from 1995 to 2016. GDP per hour worked is defined as GDP 
at fixed prices (deflated by the GDP Price Index) divided by total hours worked of all persons engaged in production. Labor compensation per hour worked is defined as total labor 
costs – employers’ social security contributions in addition to gross wages and salaries – divided by total hours worked of employees. The GDP Price Index reflects changes in the prices 
of goods and services produced in the country, while the Consumer Price Index measures the retail prices of a fixed basket of goods and services consumed. Unit labor costs are 
computed as nominal hourly total labor costs multiplied by total hours worked by the employed, divided by GDP (at fixed prices), and measure the average cost of labor per unit of output 
produced. 
                                                                    
10  Let X denote GDP at fixed prices, W the hourly nominal wage, N the number of hours worked, and Q the 
GDP price index. Real unit labor costs and the labor share in GDP are then computed as WN/X=W/(X/N) 
and WN/XQ.It should be noted that differences between Germany and France in changes in the labor 
share are less pronounced than differences in changes in unit labor costs, since the GDP price index 
rose faster in France than in Germany. 
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2.3 Trends in Employment 
In a next step, we compare trends in unemployment and employment across the nine 
countries. Trends in labor productivity (GDP per hour worked) and trends in 
unemployment are interlinked, and should thus be studied in conjunction. The 
marginal product of labor is generally thought of as following an inversely u-shaped 
pattern with respect to labor: at lower levels of production, hiring additional workers will 
increase the marginal product of labor due to gains from specialization, while at higher 
levels of production, adding labor will reduce the marginal product. At the same time, 
the relationship depends on the composition of the population of employed workers. In 
most countries, the unemployed are on average less skilled than the employed. A 
decline in unemployment may draw mostly low-skilled workers into work, worsening 
the skill composition of employed workers, and resulting in a decline in average labor 
productivity. Finally, supply and demand affect the relationship between labor 
productivity and unemployment. In a context where unemployment is low and where 
few workers are available for work, firms need to offer higher wages to attract workers 
compared to a context where unemployment is high and many workers are looking for 
jobs. 
Chart 3 plots the unemployment rate (ILO concept) and the employment rate among 
those aged 15 or over (including part-time work) over the past two decades in the nine 
countries considered, sourced from the OECD Economic Indicators.11 The nine 
countries vastly differ not only with respect to their levels of unemployment, but also 
with respect to changes in the unemployment and employment rates over time – 
showing no sign of convergence. The two countries generally considered to have the 
most flexible labor markets – the United Kingdom and the United States – show, by 
international comparison, low unemployment rates of around 5% in the years 
preceding the Great Recession. In both countries, unemployment rates sharply rose 
during the Great Recession by 3 to 5 percentage points, but have since then 
converted back to the low levels seen before the Great Recession. Employment rates 
show a mirror image. Thus, in the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
stagnation in labor productivity and wages in the post-recession years went 
hand-in-hand with a decline in unemployment and an increase in employment. 
Germany, in contrast, saw persistently high levels of unemployment throughout the 
mid-1990s and early 2000s, with a peak of 11% in 2005. Since 2005, however, the 
unemployment rate has continuously declined, and the employment rate has 
continuously increased, even during the Great Recession. In 2016, unemployment 
was at a record low level of 4%, a level not seen since the early 1980s. Employment 
rates were likewise at a record high, about 5 percentage points higher than in the 
United States, despite the fact that employment rates in the United States exceeded 
those in Germany by nearly 10 percentage points 20 years ago. Thus, during the 
post-recession years, Germany saw the best of both worlds: increasing labor 
productivity and wages, and declining unemployment. It should be noted, however, 
                                                                    
11  Employed people are those aged 15 or over who report that they have worked in gainful employment for 
at least one hour in the previous week or who had a job but were absent from work during the reference 
week. 
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that much of the rise in employment reflects increases in part-time work rather than 
full-time work (Burda, 2016; Carillo-Tudela et al., 2018).12 In addition, the German 
labor market success came at the cost of increased inequality, as we will discuss in the 
next section. 
Chart 3 
Unemployment and Employment Rates, 1995-2016 
Germany United Kingdom United States 
   
France Italy Spain 
   
Sweden Norway Denmark 
   
Sources: OECD Economic Indicators. 
Notes: The graphs plot the unemployment and employment rate between 1995 and 2016 in nine selected OECD countries. The 
unemployment rate is based on the ILO concept and computed as the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the labor force. 
The employment rate is the ratio of the employed to the working age population, aged 15 to 64. Employed people are those aged 15 or 
over who report that they have worked in gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week or who had a job but were absent 
from work during the reference week. 
Germany’s experience sharply contrasts with that of France, Italy and Spain, the other 
large countries of the eurozone. Even though unemployment in France was not much 
affected by the Great Recession, it was persistently high at about 9 to 10% throughout 
the past two decades. The employment rate remained largely flat at 65% between 
2004 and 2016 – whereas it increased from about 65% to about 75% in Germany over 
this period. 
                                                                    
12  Tax-favored part-time jobs in the form of so-called mini and midi jobs increased from around 12% of 
employees covered by social security at the end of the 1990s to 20% in 2010 (Galassi, 2018). Atypical 
employment in Germany, defined as employees with fixed-term contracts, the marginally employed, 
temporary workers and excluding the part-time employed, also increased slightly from around 6% in 1995 
to 8% of all employment in 2015 (German Council of Economic Experts, 2018). 
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Italy and Spain have fared even worse. In both countries, unemployment steadily 
declined between 1995 and up until the start of the Great Recession – from about 11% 
to 6% in Italy and from about 22% to 8% in Spain. During the Great Recession, 
however, it sharply increased to 13% in Italy and 25% in Spain. Although 
unemployment has started to come down in recent years, it remains much higher than 
in the years prior to the Great Recession. Among the nine countries considered, Italy 
and Spain further show the lowest employment rate throughout the past two decades. 
That is, Italy and Spain are not only crippled by low growth in labor productivity and 
wages, but also by high and persistent levels of unemployment. 
The Scandinavian countries are generally characterized not only by robust 
productivity and wage growth, but also by relatively high employment rates, above 
70% throughout the past two decades – considerably above the employment rates 
observed in France, Italy and Spain, and of similar magnitude as those observed 
(today) in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Unemployment is 
lowest in Norway – at about 5%, and has been persistently low throughout the past 
two decades, including during the Great Recession. Unemployment has been 
somewhat higher in Sweden and Denmark, in particular during and after the 
recession. 
2.4 Trends in Inequality 
Sluggish mean wage growth, observed in Italy and Spain throughout the past two 
decades, in Germany from the mid-1990s until the Great Recession, and in the United 
Kingdom and the United States following the Great Recession, takes on an added 
significance if it is coupled with increased wage inequality. Chart 4 plots CPI-deflated 
wage growth at three different points of the wage distribution – the 10th percentile, the 
median, and the 90th percentile – for Sweden and for five countries for which the 
authors had access to microdata: Germany (using a 10% random sample of social 
security records from the Employment History dataset of the Institute of Employment 
Research (IAB)), France (Labor Force Survey), the United Kingdom (Labor Force 
Survey), the United States (Current Population Survey), and Norway 
(Employer-Employee Register). Data for Sweden is obtained from Statistics Sweden. 
With the exception of Sweden, the analysis is restricted to full-time workers aged 20 to 
60.13 
                                                                    
13  The wage measure used in Chart 4 differs from the measure of hourly labor compensation used in 
Chart 1 in that it does not include non-wage components such as employers’ social security 
contributions. In the case of France, the wage measure further excludes employees’ social security 
contributions. Further, the analysis is restricted to full-time workers. In the case of Germany, the sample is 
restricted to workers covered by the social security system and thus excludes the self-employed and civil 
servants. Similarly, the sample for Norway excludes the self-employed. 




Evolution of the 10th, 50th, and 90th Percentiles of the Wage Distribution 
Germany France 
  




Sources: Germany: 10% random sample from the IAB Employment History, daily real wage, observations refer to June 30 of each year. 
France: French Labor Force Survey, hourly real wage net of employees’ social security contributions. United Kingdom: UK Labor Force 
Survey, hourly real wage. US: Current Population Survey, hourly real wage. Norway: Employer-Employee register made available by 
Statistics Norway, weekly real wages. Sweden: Swedish Wage Survey provided by Statistics Sweden, monthly real wage adjusted to 
reflect full-time work. 
Notes: The graphs plot CPI-deflated wage growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the wage distribution in 
six selected countries. With the exception of Sweden, the analysis is restricted to full-time workers aged between 20 and 60, and the 
wage measure (unlike in Chart 1) does not include non-wage components such employers’ social security contributions. For Germany, 
the sample is additionally restricted to employees covered by the social security system. Similarly, for Norway, the sample excludes the 
self-employed. We thank Wenchao Jin, research economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and Anna Okatenko, research economist 
at the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, for providing the figures for the United Kingdom and France, respectively. 
In Germany, wage inequality increased dramatically from 1995 to 2007, the wake of 
the Great Recession. Over this period, the real median wage barely showed any 
improvements. Real wages at the bottom of the distribution declined by 13%, whereas 
real wages at the top of the distribution increased by 10%. This trend of increasing 
inequality has come to a halt following the Great Recession: since 2010, workers 
across all parts of the wage distribution have seen considerable improvements in their 
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wage, and wages at the bottom of the wage distribution have increased slightly more 
than wages at the middle and the top of the wage distribution. 
Germany’s experience sharply contrasts with that of France where wage inequality 
has declined over the past two decades. In France, real wages at the 10th percentile 
of the wage distribution rose by more than 20% between 1995 and 2014, compared to 
12% at the median and 5% at the 90th percentile. Differences in the evolution of 
wages between France and Germany are therefore particularly striking at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. Between 1995 and 2007, wages at the 10th percentile 
declined by 13% in Germany but rose by 18% in France. At the 90th percentile, in 
contrast, wage growth was more pronounced in Germany than in France (17% versus 
5% between 1995 and 2014). These trends resulted in one of the most egalitarian 
distributions of wages observed in France since the 1960s. 
Like Germany, the United States experienced an increase in wage inequality over the 
past two decades. Unlike in Germany, however, the increase was concentrated at the 
top of the wage distribution: while the median and the 10th percentile in the United 
States have evolved at a similar pace, the 90th percentile has pulled away from the 
median, in particular in the last decade. Inequality also rose in Sweden, in particular at 
the top of the wage distribution. Although the United Kingdom is often thought of as a 
country where inequality has increased – inequality indeed rose throughout the 1980s 
(Gosling et al., 2000) – since 1995, wages at the bottom, middle and top of the wage 
distribution have actually evolved at similar rates. Following the Great Recession, 
workers at all parts of the wage distribution suffered similar declines in their real wage. 
Despite labor productivity growth of only about 20%, Norway experienced strong real 
wage growth of at least 50% at all parts of the wage distribution – in large part because 
of its favorable development in terms of trade. 
In Italy, wage inequality has remained roughly constant between 1993 and 2006 
(Naticchioni and Ricci, 2009; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010). In Spain, wage inequality 
is strongly counter-cyclical, but does not follow a clear long-run trend (Bonhomme and 
Hospido, 2016). In Denmark wage inequality has been relatively stable over the last 
decades, and is among the lowest among OECD countries (Danish Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and the Interior, 2017). 
It is important to emphasize that the changes in wage inequality depicted in Chart 4 
are likely to, in part, reflect changes in the characteristics of employed workers over 
time. If, for example, the share of college graduates among employed workers 
increases over time, and if wages of college graduates are generally more dispersed 
than wages of high school graduates, inequality will rise. Similarly, it may 
predominantly be low-skilled workers who exit the labor market in times of high 
unemployment – which will tend to increase wages at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Conversely, the record low levels of unemployment in Germany may have 
drawn predominantly low-skilled workers into work – which would tend to lower wages 
at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
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3 The Role of Unions in the Wage-Setting Process 
Which factors could possibly explain the divergent trends in labor productivity and 
wage growth, unemployment and inequality observed across the nine countries 
considered? Clearly, several factors are at play, and a detailed analysis of all possible 
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this article. In the United States, the decline of the 
labor share has recently been linked to competitive forces that favor “superstar” firms 
(Autor et al., 2017; Kehrig and Vincent, 2017; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). 
Conversely, the sluggish productivity growth in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the post-recession years has partly been attributed to low-productivity firms 
that stay in business because of record-low interest rates, but would have gone 
bankrupt in times of higher interest rates (e.g. Tenreyro, 2018). 
The increase in inequality at the top of the wage distribution observed in the United 
States and in Germany over the past two decades is typically attributed to skill- or 
routine-biased technological change that favors high-skilled workers who perform 
predominantly abstract tasks that are complementary to IT capital (Autor et al., 2003; 
Autor et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2009). Dustmann et al. (2009) further argue that 
the rise in inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution in Germany is largely 
accounted for by institutional changes, in particular a decline in unionization.14 In Italy 
and Spain, low growth in productivity and wages, coupled with high and persistent 
unemployment, likely has its roots in structural factors, including a reliance on 
low-productivity sectors, inefficient regulation, inefficient public administration, a rigid, 
two-tier labor market, and – in the case of Spain – the boom and bust of the 
construction sector. 
The focus of this paper is on the differential roles that unions play in the wage-setting 
process in different countries. Specifically, we argue that Germany’s particular system 
of industrial relations allowed for an unprecedented decentralization of the 
wage-setting process: while in the early 1990s, wages were predominantly set 
collectively at the sectoral level, they are now increasingly negotiated at the level of 
the firm or the individual worker. Coupled with the extraordinary wage restraint that 
unions showed over long periods throughout the past two decades, this 
decentralization can in part account for the low mean wage growth relative to 
productivity growth and the increase in inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution 
observed in Germany between the mid-1990s up until the Great Recession. In France, 
by contrast, the system of industrial relations prevented a similar decentralization of 
the wage-setting process. In consequence, wages grew much faster in France than in 
Germany, in particular at the bottom of the wage distribution, although labor 
productivity rose at a similar rate in the two countries. Germany’s improvement in 
competitiveness (i.e. smaller increases in unit labor costs) relative to France is 
therefore, at least in part, rooted in the differences in the systems of industrial relations 
in these two countries. Germany’s increase in competitiveness may also have 
contributed to its “employment miracle” that brought down unemployment to record 
                                                                    
14  Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017) focus on outsourcing as an additional driver of the rise in wage 
inequality in Germany. 
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low levels. The Hartz reforms, implemented between 2002 and 2005, may be another 
factor.15 
We first briefly highlight key differences in the system of industrial relations across 
countries, focusing on Germany and France. In a next step, we build the case that the 
decentralization of the wage-setting process in Germany contributed to the low 
average wage increases and rising wage inequality, and hence ultimately its improved 
competitive position. 
3.1 The Institutional Framework and the Dwindling Importance of 
Unions 
Collective bargaining over pay, working hours and working conditions between trade 
unions on the one hand, and employers on the other hand, may operate at various 
levels. In the United States and the United Kingdom, collective bargaining typically 
takes place (if it takes place at all) at the firm level; that is, the trade union negotiates 
with a single employer. In Continental Europe and the majority of the Scandinavian 
countries, in contrast, collective bargaining predominantly takes place at the sectoral 
level; that is, trade unions negotiate with a number of employers, represented by 
employer federations. 
3.1.1 Firm-Level Bargaining in the United States and the United Kingdom 
In the United States and the United Kingdom, unions may seek recognition by the firm 
if they have substantial membership rates. Often, employers “voluntarily” recognize 
the union once it seeks recognition by the firm, to avoid a legal process. In case the 
firm resists union recognition, a ballot of employees typically takes place. If enough 
employees vote in favor of the union, the employer is forced to recognize the union. 
Once the employer recognizes the union, union wages usually apply to both union 
members and non-union members. In general, union coverage rates in the United 
States rates are low; less than 15% of workers were covered by union agreements in 
2000 and 2016. In the United Kingdom, union coverage rates declined from about 
36% to 26% over the same period (see Table 1). 
                                                                    
15  For example, Fahr and Sunde (2009), Klinger and Rothe (2012), and Krebs and Scheffel (2013) conclude 
that the Hartz reforms increased employment. Price (2017), and Bradley and Kügler (2018) find small 
positive employment effects, and show that the reforms led to a more pronounced decrease in wages. 




Trends in Union Coverage 
 early 2000s 2014-2016 
Countries with predominantly firm-level bargaining   
 United States 14 11.5 
 United Kingdom 36.4 26.3 
Countries with predominantly sector-level bargaining   
 Germany (OECD) 67.8 56 
 West Germany (IAB Firm Panel) 70.2 58.3 
 East Germany (IAB Firm Panel) 56.7 47.8 
 France 97.7 98.5 
 Italy 80 80 
 Spain 82.9 73.1 
 Sweden 94 90 
 Norway 70.5 67 
 Denmark 85 84 
Sources: OECD Economic Indicators, and IAB Firm Panel for West and East Germany. 
Notes: The table reports the percentage of workers covered by a collective union agreement in selected OECD countries. It is based on 
the ratio of employees covered by collective agreements, divided by all wage earners with right to bargaining. For Germany, the table 
additionally shows the percentage of workers covered by either a sectoral or a firm level agreement based on data from the IAB Firm 
Panel. Values for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain refer to 2000 and 2016; values for France and 
Norway refer to 2002 and 2014; and values for Sweden and Denmark refer to 2000 and 2015. 
Both countries have a statutory minimum wage. In the United Kingdom, a nation-wide 
minimum wage was introduced in 1998. At this time, the ratio between the minimum 
and median wage was 0.41, and it since increased to 0.45 in 2005 and to 0.49 in 2015. 
The nation-wide minimum wage in the United States is somewhat less generous with 
a ratio between minimum and median wage of about 0.37 throughout the past two 
decades – although some states, and recently cities, have implemented much higher 
minimum wages. The introduction of the minimum wage in 1998 in the United 
Kingdom and its subsequent increases may be one reason why wage inequality has 
stopped increasing since the mid to late 1990s (see e.g. Butcher et al., 2012). 
Table 2 
Minimum Wage Relative to Median Wages 
 1995 2005 2015 
United States 0.35 0.32 0.36 
United Kingdom - 0.45 0.49 
Germany - - 0.47 
France 0.52 0.60 0.61 
Spain 0.38 0.37 0.37 
Sources: OECD statistics. 
Notes: The table reports the ratio between the minimum wage and the median wage of full-time employees for the five out of nine 
countries which have a statutory minimum wage in place. The statutory minimum wage was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1998 
and in Germany in 2015. 
3.1.2 Germany: Decentralization of the Wage-Setting Process 
The German system of industrial relations is not rooted in legislation, nor is it governed 
by a formal political process. Instead, it is laid out in contracts and mutual agreements 
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between the three main labor market parties: trade unions, employer federations, and 
work councils (i.e. workers’ representatives in the firm). 
The core aspect of the German system is the principle of autonomy of wage 
bargaining, outlined in the constitution. It implies that negotiations between trade 
unions and employer federations take place without the government directly exerting 
influence. As such, union agreements apply only to those firms that belong to an 
employer federation and that thus recognize union agreements. In firms that recognize 
unions, union wages apply to all employees, regardless of whether or not they are 
union members. Firm membership of an employer federation is voluntary. Firms can 
leave the employer federation at their own discretion; they can also decide not to enter 
the employer federation in the first place. After opting out of a collective agreement, 
firms must honor the collective agreement for incumbent employees for a specified 
period of time, or until a new agreement has been reached at the firm level in 
cooperation with the work council. At the same time, these firms are immediately free 
to set wages for new hires (see for example, Carlin and Soskice, 2008, Bispinck et al., 
2010, Brändle et al., 2011). 
Thus, a key difference between the German system of industrial relations, those in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, and in particular in a number of countries in Continental 
Europe, is that the German firms cannot be forced to recognize union agreements. 
The fact that German firms can vote with their feet and opt out of union agreements 
altogether fosters negotiations that are usually far more consensus-based and less 
confrontational than in other countries.16 Data on strikes are quite revealing in this 
respect: between 1991 and 1999, Germany lost an average of eleven days of work 
each year per 1000 employees, and only five days between 2000 and 2007. This 
contrasts sharply with strike days in France (73 and 103 days over the same time 
periods) and Italy (158 and 93 days). Even in the United States the number of days of 
work lost due to strikes per 1000 employees was higher than in Germany (40 and 
32 days), despite much lower union coverage rates (Lesch, 2009). 
The fact that firms cannot be forced to pay high union wages begs the question why 
nevertheless many firms choose to do so. One important reason is for firms to save 
the transaction costs of negotiating wages with each worker individually. Adhering to 
sector-wide union wages also makes the wage-setting process transparent. 
Sector-wide union wages may also be considered as “fair payment” or a “social norm”, 
and it may be costly for firms to deviate from this norm. 
Since the early to mid-1990s, Germany has witnessed an unprecedented decline in 
union coverage rates. In 1995 (the first year for which reliable data are available from 
the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) Firm Panel): 83% of West German 
employees were covered by union agreements, 72.2% by a sectoral level agreement 
and 10.9% by a firm level agreement (see Chart 5). By 2016, union coverage rates in 
West Germany had fallen to 58%. This decline is primarily driven by firms opting out of 
sectoral agreements (rather than by larger growth rates of firms that do not recognize 
                                                                    
16  The consensus-based nature of negotiations is further encouraged by the representation of employees in 
boards, another component of the institutional framework that is unique to Germany. 
ECB Forum on Central Banking, June 2018 
 
233 
union agreements). Chart 5 further highlights that union coverage rates are higher in 
West than in East Germany, and that in both West and East Germany, the decline in 
union coverage rates was particularly dramatic in the mid-1990s and the early-2000s 
when aggregate wage growth was particularly sluggish, and wages at the bottom of 
the distribution dropped sharply. The decline has slowed down substantially since 
2010 – after which aggregate wage growth, including at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, has picked up once more. 
Chart 5 
Union Coverage Rates in West and East Germany, 1995-2016 
 
Sources: IAB Firm Panel. 
Notes: The chart depicts the share of workers covered by either a sectoral or a firm level agreement in West and East Germany. 
The fall in union coverage rates has led to a dramatic decentralization of the 
wage-setting process in Germany, from the industry level to the level of the firm, or 
even to the individual worker. In addition, wages have become increasingly dependent 
on the specific economic conditions of the firm through so-called “opening” or 
“hardship” clauses, even among those firms that continue to recognize sector-wide 
union agreements. As part of the overall sectoral agreement, firms may use opening 
clauses to deviate downward from collectively agreed industry-wide standards. Trade 
unions often agreed to such deviations in order to prevent further firm opt-outs of the 
sectoral agreements. At first, these opening clauses focused on hours of work, but 
later they also affected wages. Initially, the opening clauses were only temporary to 
avoid bankruptcy, but later they were also implemented to ensure competitiveness in 
more general terms. A firm that makes use of an opening clause negotiates the details 
concerning pay and working time agreements with the work council. As a 
consequence, the role of work councils in industrial relations has become increasingly 
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In terms of prevalence, Brändle et al. (2011, Figure 1) report that among industry-wide 
collective contracts in German manufacturing, less than 5% involved opening clauses 
for wages in 1995, but this had risen to about 60% by 2004. According to a survey of 
work councils in 2005, about 75% of firms bound by a sectoral agreements used 
opening clauses (Bispinck 2007; Bispinck et al., 2010). Take-up rates are somewhat 
smaller according to the IAB Firm Panel. In 2011, 41% of firms covered by a sectoral 
agreement were aware of the existence of an opening clause in their industry. Of 
those, 71% made use of the opening clause. Deviations from the industry-wide 
agreements in terms of working time are the most common form of opening clause 
used, but deviations in terms of pay are also widespread. 
To summarize, since the mid-1990s Germany has undergone a dramatic 
decentralization of the wage-setting process, from the sectoral level to the level of the 
firm or the individual worker. This development is due to firms opting out of sectoral 
agreements on the one hand, and due to deviations from industry-wide standards 
through opening clauses among firms bound by sectoral agreements on the other 
hand. As we argue in Section 3.2 below, this decentralization contributed to low 
average real wage growth relative to productivity growth, and hence an improvement 
in competitiveness (measured as a relative reduction in unit labor costs) throughout 
the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. It is important to emphasize that this process 
happened without the intervention of the German government. It was only in 2014 that 
the German government deviated from the principle of autonomy of wage bargaining 
and introduced a statutory minimum wage that applies to all workers and firms in the 
economy. The minimum wage was initially set at €8.50 per hour and came into effect in 
January 2015. The ratio between minimum wage and median wage of 0.46 is 
substantially higher than that in the United States (0.36), similar to that in the United 
Kingdom, and substantially lower than the one in place in France (0.61), as shown in 
Table 2. Recent research suggests that the introduction of the minimum wage in 
Germany boosted wages in particular at the lower end of the wage distribution 
(e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2018). 
3.1.3 Industry-Level Bargaining in Southern European Countries 
As in Germany, collective bargaining in France predominantly takes place at the 
sectoral level. The two countries, however, differ in one key aspect: whereas in 
Germany negotiations between trade unions and employer federations take place 
without the government directly exerting influence, the government plays an active 
role in the wage-setting process in France. Most importantly, the French government 
declares virtually all collective agreements negotiated between trade unions and 
employer federations to be binding. That is, union agreements apply to all firms in the 
sector, regardless of whether a firm belongs to an employer federation. This sharply 
contrasts with the system in Germany where the recognition of union agreements is 
left to the firm’s discretion. In consequence, union coverage rates in France have been 
close to 100% throughout the past 15 years (see Table 1). In addition, the French 
government sets a wage floor through a statutory minimum wage that is binding for 
(nearly) all workers and firms in the economy. The minimum wage is set a high level by 
international standards: the ratio between the minimum wage and the median was 
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0.56 in 2000 and 0.61 in 2015 – substantially higher than in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and in particular the United States. Increases in the national minimum wage 
follow an explicit legal rule, are indexed to the change in the inflation rate as well as to 
the increase in the blue-collar base wage rate, and allow for an additional 
governmental discretionary increase (Fougère et al., 2016). Minimum wage increases 
directly affect the wages of about 10-15% of workers, and sectoral agreements build 
on changes in the minimum wage, which cannot be undercut. The high minimum 
wage, as well as the extension of union agreements to all firms and workers in the 
economy, may well have contributed to the strong wage growth throughout the past 
two decades, in particular at the bottom of the wage distribution (see Chart 4). At the 
same time, the high minimum wage and the extension of union agreements to all firms 
may be in part responsible for the persistently high unemployment (see Chart 3). 
It is interesting to note that recently, the systems of industrial relations in Germany and 
France are somewhat converging. Germany introduced, for the first time in its history, 
a statutory minimum wage in 2015 – albeit not at a level as high as that in France. The 
Hollande government made a first step in introducing German-style opening clauses 
in France in 2014, and in 2018, president Macron went a step further with his reforms 
aimed at liberalizing the labor market. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 4. 
In contrast to France, the governments in Italy and Spain do not explicitly intervene in 
the wage-setting process by extending agreements negotiated between trade unions 
and employer federations to all firms in the sector. Yet, de facto, union agreements 
apply in most sectors to all firms. Union wages are considered as “fair payment” and in 
Italy, workers can go to court to sue firms for higher pay. Whereas in Italy union 
agreements are binding only for workers on permanent contracts, they apply to all 
workers, including those on fixed term contracts, in Spain. In both countries, union 
coverage rates have remained roughly constant at about 80% since 2000 (see 
Table 1). Spain, but not Italy, further has a statutory minimum wage. The ratio between 
the Spanish minimum and median wage of 0.37 is, however, low by international 
standards. 
Similar to France, Spain introduced some reforms in 2012 (“Law 3/2012”) that partially 
decentralized the wage-setting process, from the sectoral to the firm level. To better 
reflect the economic situation of the firm, firms were given more flexibility to modify 
sectoral union agreements. The reform further introduced the possibility for firms to 
opt out of a collective agreement, provided that workers’ representatives agree. Italy, 
in contrast, has not yet made a major attempt of shifting the wage-setting process from 
the sectoral to the firm level. Instead, Italy’s reform efforts – in particular “Monti’s 
Legge Fornero” introduced in 2012 and “Renzi’s Jobs Act” introduced in 2014 – have 
so far primarily concentrated on making it easier for firms to hire workers on fixed-term 
contracts (which leads indirectly to a decentralization of the wage-setting process as 
union agreements only apply to workers on permanent contracts). In addition, the 
reforms eased some of the restrictions regulating the firing of workers on permanent 
contracts. 
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3.1.4 Collective Bargaining in Nordic Countries 
Union coverage rates in the Nordic countries are high, with around 70% of the work 
force covered in Norway, around 80% in Denmark and around 90% in Sweden (see 
Table 1). Even though the government does not explicitly declare union agreements to 
be binding for all firms in the sector, the social norm is such that most firms in the 
sector recognize the agreements. Generally, employer federations and unions closely 
cooperate and take the general economic situation into account when negotiating. The 
outcome of the sectoral wage-setting is a minimum wage increase that can be 
supplemented by further wage increases negotiated at the firm level, which would take 
into account a firm’s profitability and productivity (e.g. Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
2013, for Norway). 
3.2 The Case of Germany: Wage Decentralization and Aggregate Wage 
Growth 
As emphasized in the previous section, Germany – as the only one of the nine 
countries considered – witnessed an unprecedented shift of wage-setting from the 
sectoral level to the level of the firm or the individual worker. This decentralization 
occurred because more and more firms opted out of union agreements, and because 
trade unions agreed to so-called opening clauses that allow firms that recognize a 
union nevertheless to pay wages below the industry-wide standards. In this section, 
we argue that this decentralization of the wage-setting process was an important 
factor behind Germany’s low growth of wages relative to productivity, and the strong 
wage declines at the bottom of the wage distribution throughout the mid-1990s until 
the mid-2000s. 
3.2.1 The Role of De-Unionization 
There is ample evidence that unions raise wages, in particular for workers at the 
bottom of the wage distribution. In Germany, workers who are employed in firms that 
recognize a sectoral-wide agreement earn 25% higher wages on average than 
workers who are employed in firms that recognize neither a sectoral nor a firm level 
agreement, according to the IAB Firm Panel linked to social security records (LIAB), 
for 1995 to 2012.17 This large wage differential reflects in part differential 
characteristics of the two types of firms: firms that are bound by sectoral union 
agreements are on average larger and operate more often in high-wage industries 
such as manufacturing and mining than firms bound by neither a sectoral nor a 
firm-level agreement. However, even conditional on firm size and industry, workers in 
unionized firms earn up to 15% higher wages than in non-unionized firms. 
It is therefore natural to ask: to what extent did the decline in union coverage rates 
contribute to the low wage growth observed in Germany, and hence its improvements 
                                                                    
17  The sample is restricted to full-time workers aged 20 to 60. 
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in international competitiveness, in particular in the years prior to the Great 
Recession? We investigate this question in Chart 6. The chart first depicts the 
observed wage growth between 1995 and 2012 along the wage distribution (the black 
line). The chart highlights the sharp increase in inequality observed in Germany over 
this period. Whereas wages at the bottom of the wage distribution declined by more 
than 5% (the 10th percentile), wages at the top (the 90th percentile) rose by about 
12%. The chart further plots the “counterfactual” wage growth that would have 
occurred if unionization rates had remained at their 1995 levels. To construct this 
counterfactual wage growth, we use the reweighting approach developed in DiNardo 
et al. (1996). The chart indicates that wages would have been between 3 and 6% 
higher in 2012 if unionization rates had not declined. The chart further highlights that 
counterfactual wage growth exceeds actual wage growth throughout the entire wage 
distribution, but the difference is particularly pronounced at the lower end. These 
results should be interpreted with some caution, as they are based on strong 
assumptions, including the assumption that the wage differential between unionized 
and non-unionized firms does not change for different levels of unionization. 
Nevertheless, the findings indicate that declining union coverage rates at least in part 
account for the low wage growth observed in Germany. It should further be noted that 
the specific timing of the de-unionization process roughly coincides with the timing of 
real wage stagnation: the decline in union coverage rates has slowed down since 
2010 (see Chart 5), after which wage growth, in particular at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, finally picked up again (see Charts 1 and 4). 
Chart 6 
Actual and Counterfactual Real Wage Growth Along the Wage Distribution, 1996-2012 
 
Sources: IAB Firm Panel merged to social security records from the IAB Employment History data file (LIAB; social security records refer 
to June 30 of each year). 
Notes: The chart plots actual and counterfactual real wage growth (CPI deflated) between 1996 and 2012 along the wage distribution. 
Counterfactual wage growth refers to growth that would have occurred if union coverage rates had remained at their 1996 levels. This 
counterfactual wage growth is calculated using the reweighting approach by DiNardo et al. (1996). The sample is restricted to full-time 
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3.2.2 Aggregate Wage Growth in Firms Bound by Sector-Wide 
Agreements 
While the opting out of firms from sectoral agreements played an important role in 
explaining Germany’s low wage growth, it only tells part of the story. Chart 7 highlights 
that wages barely grew more among firms that are bound by a sectoral agreement 
compared to firms that are neither bound by a sectoral nor by a firm level agreement 
between 1996 and 2012. 
Chart 7 
Real Wage Growth in Firms Bound by Sectoral Union Agreements and in Firms Not 
Bound by Union Agreements 
 
Sources: IAB Firm Panel merged to social security records from the IAB Employment History data file (LIAB; social security records refer 
to June 30). 
Notes: The chart plots (CPI-deflated) wage growth in firms that are bound by a sectoral union agreement and in firms that are neither 
bound by a sectoral nor by a firm union agreement. 
The similar wage growth in firms bound and not bound by sectoral agreements may in 
part be because the characteristics of firms not subject to a sectoral agreement have 
improved over time, as more and more firms opted out of such agreements. Another 
reason for the low aggregate wage growth in firms covered by sectoral agreements 
are opening clauses, which allow firms to deviate downward from collectively agreed 
industry-wide standards. As discussed above, opening clauses have led to a shift of 
the wage-setting process from the sectoral to the firm level even among firms that 
recognize sectoral agreements, and have significantly strengthened the role of work 
councils in industrial relations. 
A second reason for the low wage growth that occurred also in firms not bound by 
sectoral agreements is the extraordinary wage restraint shown by trade unions over 
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(cumulative and CPI-deflated, obtained from the Tarifarchiv of the Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), the red line) in conjunction with realized total 
hourly wage compensation (also CPI-deflated, as in Chart 1, the green line) over the 
past two decades. The chart first highlights that real wage increases agreed upon by 
trade unions and employer federations exceed realized wage increases throughout 
the entire period. One reason for this is that union agreements apply only in firms that 
choose to recognize them; and a second reason is that even firms that recognize 
union agreements often have some room for downward adjustments from the sectoral 
agreements, through opening clauses. Chart 8 further shows that in eleven out of 
21 years, trade unions accepted zero real wage increases, as nominal wage 
increases were just equal to the (CPI) inflation rate. The period between 2003 and 
2008 is particularly remarkable. Over this five-year period, wages negotiated between 
trade unions and employer federations did not increase in real terms – even though 
productivity increased by six percentage points and unemployment declined from 
9.6% to 7.5%. Realized real wages substantially declined, and Germany improved its 
competitive position – measured as smaller increases in unit labor costs (see 
Chart 4) – relative to France (and a number of other European countries) primarily 
over this period. The first significant increase in real union wages occurred from 2008 
to 2009 when the Great Recession hit and labor productivity declined. However, this 
large increase was once again followed by three years of no or small increases. 
After 2010, when unemployment rates were at a record low, union wage demands 
have picked up considerably. 
Chart 8 
Union Real Wage Growth and Realized Real Wage Growth in Germany, 1995-2016 
 
Sources: Cumulative wage increases agreed between trade unions and employer federations: WSI Tarifarchiv. Realized hourly wage 
growth and GDP per hour worked: OECD Economic Indicators. 
Notes: The chart depicts GDP per hour worked as a measure for labor productivity (as in Chart 1; the blue squares), and realized growth 
in total labor compensation per hour (CPI deflated, as in Chart 1; the green triangles). The chart further shows the cumulative wage 
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3.2.3 Which Factors Contributed to Wage Decentralization in Germany? 
Why did German firms opt out of sectoral union agreements, starting in the early to 
mid-1990s? Several factors are at play. The German unification provided an 
unprecedented challenge to the German economy and was in part responsible for 
Germany’s dismal performance throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain, moving production to Central and Eastern European 
countries – where workers were highly skilled and wages were low – became a 
possibility for German firms. It thus became increasingly costly for firms to pay high 
union wages.18 Finally, East German firms were considerably less likely to recognize 
union agreements than West German firms, which may have made it more socially 
acceptable also for West German firms to opt out of union agreements. 
Why did trade unions agree to opening clauses and wage increases much below 
productivity increases, even in times of falling unemployment? In part, unions explicitly 
agreed to accept lower wages to foster employment growth in the 1990s in response 
to the new economic realities. But at least as important, Germany’s system of 
industrial relations allows firms to walk away from unfavorable union agreements and 
indeed, more and more firms did just that. German trade unions were willing to make 
concessions unheard of in other countries in order not to become further marginalized. 
At the same time, wage moderation practiced by trade unions is not only an 
expression of weaker bargaining power, but also reflects unions’ objective to 
contribute to the creation of jobs by restraining wage growth (Wolf, 2000). 
Why did the same shifting of the wage-setting process from the sectoral to the firm or 
individual level not happen in other countries? On the one hand, Germany was 
considerably more affected by the fall of the Iron Curtain than other countries, not only 
because of the reunification, but also by being geographically close to the former 
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Equally important, the German 
system of industrial relations proved to be much more flexible than many would have 
expected, by allowing for more decentralized wage-setting without the intervention of 
the German government. Moreover, the decentralization process – and ultimately the 
low aggregate wage growth and the increase in inequality – was relatively 
consensus-based, and it was, at least to some extent, supported by trade unions and 
works councils. In contrast, the industrial systems of France, Italy and Spain do simply 
not allow for the same inherent options of flexible adaptation as the German system. 
There is considerably less scope for a similar decentralization of wage-setting within 
their systems of industrial relations where union agreements are, either explicitly by 
the government or de facto by courts, enforced upon most firms in the economy. In 
these countries, greater wage flexibility will require government interventions – a 
process that has proved to be politically costly, and that has been met with 
considerable resistance in the population. 
                                                                    
18  In line with this argument, Burda (2000) predicted that the EU-accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries would lead to a reduction of labor market rigidities in the old EU member countries 
(including Germany). 
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4 Conclusion and Discussion 
The economies of Continental European, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries have 
evolved differently over the past two decades. 
The two Anglo-Saxon countries considered in this chapter, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, experienced labor productivity and wage growth throughout the 
mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. In these countries, unemployment sharply increased 
during the Great Recession. Both productivity and wages have largely stagnated since 
the Great Recession, but employment is now back to pre-crisis levels. The three 
Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, are generally characterized 
by robust productivity and wage growth, as well as relatively low unemployment 
throughout the past two decades. Neither Italy nor Spain experienced significant 
improvements in living standards over the past two decades, in large part due to 
stagnating labor productivity. These two countries are also crippled by exceptionally 
high unemployment rates that even today are considerably higher than just before the 
Great Recession. 
A comparison between France and Germany reveals some striking differences in 
recent developments. Labor productivity evolved at a similar pace in the two countries 
over the past two decades, increasing by about 1.5% per year. Yet, wages evolved 
very differently. Whereas consumer wages increased roughly in tandem with 
productivity in France, in Germany consumer wages were no higher in 2008 than they 
were in 1995. Differences in wage growth between the two countries are particularly 
striking at the bottom of the wage distribution. In consequence, Germany substantially 
improved its competitive position – measured as smaller increases in unit labor 
costs – relative to France (and many other countries) over this period. At the same 
time, unemployment is now at a record low in Germany (4%) whereas it remains 
stubbornly high, at about 10%, in France. 
We have argued in this paper that the low wage growth in Germany – and hence its 
increased competitiveness – is in part a consequence of an unprecedented 
decentralization of the wage-setting process that started in Germany in the mid-1990s, 
from the sectoral level down to the level of the firm or even the individual worker. This 
process was made possible by Germany’s unique system of industrial relations that 
allows firms to opt out of sectoral union agreements, and to set wages collectively at 
the level of the firm instead, through negotiations between the firm and the work 
council, or individually, through negotiations between the firm and the individual 
worker. 
Starting in the early 1990s, firms have increasingly made use of this option, and union 
coverage rates dropped from above 80% in 1996 to 58% in 2016. In order to prevent 
further loss of influence, trade unions responded by showing exceptional wage 
restraint even in times of robust productivity growth and declining unemployment. 
Trade unions also agreed to so-called opening clauses that allow a firm bound by 
sectoral agreements nevertheless to pay wages below the sector-wide union wage, 
provided that the firm’s work council agrees. 
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Is the increased decentralization of the wage-setting process also responsible for 
Germany’s “employment miracle”, and the current record-low unemployment rates? 
Or are the so-called “Hartz Reforms” of the labor market, implemented by the 
government under Gerhard Schröder in 2003, responsible, as argued by some 
economists (see for instance, Rinne and Zimmermann, 2012, 2013)? Among other 
things, the Hartz reforms allowed for new types of employment with lower tax and 
insurance payments (mini and midi jobs), and reduced and limited unemployment 
benefits, in particular of the long-term unemployed. While it is impossible to answer 
this question conclusively, one possibility is that both increased wage flexibility and the 
Hartz Reforms contributed to the rise in employment rates. On the one hand, high 
wage floors may prevent firms from creating low wage jobs; on the other hand, 
workers have few incentives to accept low wage jobs when unemployment benefits 
are relatively high. 
More generally, it is questionable that it is in a country’s interest to improve its 
competitiveness through low wage growth over a long time period, especially if it goes 
hand in hand with increasing wage inequality. However, if trade unions play an 
important role in the wage-setting process and generally demand high wages, some 
wage restraint over a limited time period may be a beneficial response to economic 
shocks or to more long-term unfavorable economic developments. The process of 
wage restraint occurred in Germany in a remarkably consensus-based way, given that 
it kept real wages for the average German worker almost constant over a fifteen-year 
period. However, the periods of low wage growth seem to have come to an end, as 
wage growth has significantly improved in the post-recession years, in particular at the 
bottom end of the wage distribution. At the same time, the decline in union coverage 
rates has considerably slowed down, and after years of extraordinary wage restraint, 
wage demands of trade unions have picked up once more. Moreover, for the first time 
in its history, the German government deviated from the principle of autonomy of wage 
bargaining by introducing a statutory minimum wage that applies to all workers and 
firms in the economy, with only a few exceptions. The introduction of the minimum 
wage helped to bring up wages, in particular at the bottom of the wage distribution 
(e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2018). 
At the same time, there is some evidence that the systems of industrial relations in 
France and Spain are moving a step closer to that of Germany. The past two French 
governments have implemented labor market reforms that aimed at shifting the 
determination of wages and working conditions away from the sector, to the level of 
the firm. In 2014, Hollande approved a reform that essentially introduced 
German-style opening clauses that allow firms to pay wages below the sector-wide 
union wage, in case the firm faces economic difficulties. In 2018, Macron went a step 
further, by allowing firms to bargain with trade unions or works councils over wages 
and working conditions regardless of the firm’s economic situation, provided that 
worker representatives in the firm agree. In addition, in the case of a downturn, firms 
are now able to strike a “rapid, simplified” deal with the trade union or works council to 
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change wages or working hours to reflect the new market conditions better. Both 
Hollande and Macron further eased restrictions to fire workers.19 
Spain even went a step further than France. The “Law 3/2012”, implemented in 2012, 
partially decentralized the wage-setting process, away from the sectoral to the firm 
level, by giving firms more opportunities to modify sectoral union agreements to reflect 
the economic situation of the firm better (Gobierno de España, 2012; Banco de 
España, 2013). The reform further introduced the possibility for firms to opt out of 
collective agreements, provided that workers’ representatives agree, moving a step 
closer to Germany’s system of industrial relations. In contrast, Italy’s reform efforts – in 
particular “Monti’s Legge Fornero” introduced in 2012 and “Renzi’s Jobs Act” of 2014 – 
have so far primarily concentrated on making it easier for firms to hire workers on 
fixed-term contracts – which may indirectly lead to a partial decentralization of the 
wage-setting process, as union agreements only apply to workers on permanent 
contracts. In addition, these reforms somewhat eased firing restrictions for workers on 
permanent contracts. 
Despite some convergence, these recent developments underscore some crucial 
differences to Germany: Germany’s system of industrial relations proved to be much 
more flexible than that of France, Spain and Italy. The decentralization of the 
wage-setting process, from the sectoral level to the level of the firm and the individual 
worker, was possible without the intervention of the German government and without 
any legislative changes. In France, Spain and Italy, in contrast, governments have 
been required to step in and make legislative changes (possibly) to set a similar wage 
decentralization process into motion. At least as importantly, in Germany, the shift from 
sectoral to firm and individual wage negotiations was relatively consensus-based and 
was generally supported by trade unions and works councils. In France, Spain and 
Italy, by contrast, the reforms were controversial and have been met with some 
resistance by trade unions and the population at large. Whether the reforms will be 
successful in improving competitiveness and ultimately in reducing unemployment in 
these countries remains to be seen. 
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